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Approved For Release 2005/06/23 : CIA-RDP79M00096A000300010013-6

IHC-MM-372
27 December 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: ASD/I - COINS Evaluation Review Group - 7th Meeting

1. Attached is a list of attendees at the 7th meeting of the ASD/I COINS Evaluation Review Group, held in the Pentagon, Room 3E267, 0930 to 1215 hours on 20 December 1972.

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7. [] commented that we have been living in a COMSEC world for over 25 years and that there is a similarity here to EDP teleprocessing systems. The members of the Review Group agreed with him.


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9. He discussed problems associated with spillage caused by hardware failures (which are impossible to prevent), manual mis-routing and software failures causing errors in routing. [] said that you can minimize this problem but you cannot eliminate or absolutely prevent spillage. He made a comparison between the spillage associated with an ADP system and similar occurrences in the non-ADP handling of classified data. He stated that spillage occurs in bursts, mainly caused by hardware failures or new software techniques. He talked about preventing spillage by using file labeling techniques and various authentication verification techniques. His personal opinion was that the computer

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security problem is overly emphasized. He talked about



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11. The TIPS (Technical Information Processing System) using 24 each HIS 516 mini-computers for file search, on-line, of 40 files. A subset of TIPS files is dedicated for COINS.



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25X1 18. [] DIA, gave a brief presentation on the
25X1 DIAOLS security test and evaluation which was conducted from
15 February to 1 August 1972. She cited problems in using a
general use programming language (i.e., GECOS) and that DIA
cannot rely on hardware and software alone but must consider
many factors among which are: physical security, (accessability
to the terminal/computer center), COMSEC protection, etc. She
reviewed briefly the use of the two HIS 635 computers and the
Data Net 30 front-end processors that interconnect the terminals
to the CPUs. She discussed dedicating one of the 635s for file
access storage and retrieval using the ISS and TILE query lan-
guages. The other 635 would be used for FORTRAN and Basic
compilers. She also stated that all terminals in the DIAOLS/
IDHS network are at an SI level.

25X1 19. [] COINS Security Officer, reviewed the
proposed plan for upgrading the COINS system to the TK level.
He mentioned that there has been a COINS security panel with
representation from all of the COINS participating agencies,
including NPIC, chaired by [] since March 1969. 25X1
This group developed the COINS operational procedure Number 5
which was supposed to be implemented some 18 months ago; however,
during the discussion it appears that it is not being used
outside of NSA. The security panel also implemented TMA Number
3 which contains the procedures to control the access to the
CPU at a SI/TK level. These procedures were implemented in
25X1 September 1972 on [] computer. The panel also developed
audit trail guidelines for COINS and a plan for a simulated
TK test of the COINS network. [] stated that the
NSA proposal to upgrade COINS includes the above implementation
plus DIA fixes cited in the DIAOLS security test and evaluation
report of August 1972. They propose that these measures be
accomplished vice the proposal from [] DIA, to up- 25X1
grade the entire COINS system to the TK level. [] 25X1
stated that this would probably entail clearing a small number
of people at a TK level. When all of these items have been
accomplished, then the system would be tested. To implement
25X1 [] plan to upgrade the entire COINS complex would
25X1 entail clearing everyone that has access to the [] 25X1
a TK level. [] also gave a brief synopsis of DCID
1/16 discussing responsibilities and testing.

25X1 20. [] commented that he had been told that the
DIAOLS system was secure and found not to be secure. He stated
that the NSA system although cited as being secure has not been
tested and he's not sure if it is a secure system. He also
stated that the NSA system is operating in violation of DCID 1/16.
25X1 During the discussion [] NSA, stated that the [] 25X1
has never been approved by the Director of NSA for handling
multi-level security information. [] discussed the 25X1

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25X1 differences of personnel background level investigations, the problems associated with the present NSA benign environment and concern over a future operating environment. He stated that the need-to-know problem within the TK clearance category is a security problem vis-a-vis a privacy problem as discussed by [redacted]. Some discussion ensued at this point on methods of handling need-to-know information outside of the ADP environment.

21. He stated that DCID 1/16 cites a goal of less than absolute security protection of the system. This document was prepared in January 1971 and his Computer Security Subcommittee of SECOM-USIB is planning to upgrade this document. If DCID 1/16 is not implemented the computer system must be cleared for the highest level of data on the system. He discussed the testing of the system referred to in DCID 1/16 and briefly reviewed "Guidelines for the Security Analyses Testing and Evaluation of Resource Sharing Computer Systems" dated 7 April 1971.

22. He stated it is necessary to define the system and the environment in which the system or portions thereof are operating. He also said that it is necessary to define the statutory requirements for the system such as the DoD Directives, DCIDs, and AEC restricted data statutes.

25X1 23. He discussed two methods of testing, which he described as in-house (which consists of testing the features of the system) and the other as out-house (which involves penetration of the system). He stated that each portion of the COINS network should be tested separately before the complete network is tested. [redacted] however, stated that there was no approved general or specific testing plan available to the community.

25X1 24. He commented that he doesn't want a short-term solution to the COINS security problem but wants a long-term solution. The NSA and DIA members stated that this was not possible. [redacted] 25X1 [redacted] commented that we can only achieve what is possible technically or economical and not what [redacted] desires. 25X1

25X1 25. [redacted] NSA, raised some questions relative to a possible test of the [redacted] based upon discussions at this meeting by the Review Group. She commented that new systems in the future will use different technology which will afford better security than is presently available and questioned the worth of testing the present system. [redacted] thought that an outside group should be responsible for testing the [redacted] 25X1 if it needs to be tested, rather than the [redacted] 25X1 designers that built the system. 25X1

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25X1 26. The tone of the discussions relative to the security of the [redacted] revolved around the degree of security that has been achieved in this system. Another feature that is very critical to this analysis has to be the economic cost of unauthorized penetration of the [redacted] which was not mentioned by the Review Group. 25X1

25X1 27. [redacted] summarized the data presented by the briefors. [redacted] thanked all of the briefors for their presentations and stated that the next meeting of the Review Group will be held on Thursday at 0930, 28 December 1972 in Room 3C200, Pentagon. This was subsequently cancelled and will be rescheduled for the 4th of January 1973. 25X1

[redacted]
IC Staff

Att

25X1 cc: [redacted]

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